Noninterference requires that there is no information flow from sensitive to public data in a given system. However, many systems release sensitive information as part of their intended function and therefore violate noninterference. To control information flow while permitting information release, some systems have a downgrading or declassification mechanism, but this creates the danger that it may cause unintentional information release. This paper shows that a robustness property can be used to characterize programs in which declassification mechanisms cannot be controlled by attackers to release more information than intended. It describes a simple way to provably enforce this robustness property through a type-based compile-time program analysis. The paper also presents a generalization of robustness that supports upgrading (endorsing) data integrity.
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Information flow controls have many appealing properties as a security enforcement mechanism. Unlike access controls, they track the propagation of information and prevent sensitive information from being released, regardless of how that information is transformed by the system. Dually, information flow controls may be used to enforce data integrity. One common formal underpinning of these mechanisms is the noninterference security property [19] , which imposes an end-to-end requirement on the behavior of the system: sensitive data may not affect public data. Recent work on languagebased enforcement of confidentiality (e.g., [48, 1, 20, 44, 46, 2, 41, 35, 42, 52, 3, 36] ) have used various flavors of noninterference as the definition of security. However, in practice noninterference is too strong; real systems leak some amount of sensitive information as part of their proper functioning.
One way to accommodate information release is to allow explicit declassification or downgrading of sensitive information (e.g., [17, 31, 35, 8] ). These mechanisms are inherently unsafe and create the possibility that a downgrading channel may release information in a way that was not intended by the system designer.
Given that noninterference is not satisfied, we would like to know that the information release occurs as intended, in accordance with some kind of security policy. However, it seems difficult in general to express these policies precisely and even more difficult to show that systems satisfy them [43] . Therefore a reasonable strategy is instead to identify and enforce important aspects of the intended security policy rather than trying to express and enforce the entire policy.
A recent example of this approach is robust declassification, a security property introduced by Zdancewic and Myers [51] in the context of a state transition system. Robustness addresses an important issue for security analysis: the possibility that an attacker can affect some part of the system. If a system contains declassification, it is possible that an attacker can cause the declassification mechanism to release more information than was intended. A system whose declassification is robust may release information, but it gives attackers no control over what information is released or whether information is released. Although this paper is about robust declassification, robustness has been explored for other aspects of information security, such as information erasure [7] .
Robustness is an important property for systems that may be attacked; for example, it is particularly important for distributed systems containing untrusted host machines, but is also useful for systems that simply process some untrusted input that might affect later information release. However, robustness is not intended to be a complete answer to the question of whether information release is secure. Additional useful ways to reason about information release include delimited information release [40] , intransitive noninterference [38, 34, 37, 28] , quantitative information flow [14, 30, 27, 9, 10] , and complexity-bounded information flow [47, 22, 23] . However, among these only robustness directly addresses the important problem of attackers who exploit declassification.
This paper generalizes previous work on robust declassification in several ways. First, the paper shows how to express it in a language-based setting: specifically, for a simple imperative programming language. Second, it generalizes robust declassification so that untrusted code and data are explicitly part of the system rather than having them appear only when there is an active attack. Third, it introduces a relaxed security guarantee called qualified robustness that gives untrusted code and data a limited ability to affect information release.
The key technical result of the paper is a demonstration that both robustness and qualified robustness can be enforced by compile-time program analyses based on sim-ple security type systems. Using lightweight annotations, these type systems track data confidentiality and integrity, in a manner similar to earlier work by Zdancewic [50] . However, this paper takes the new step of proving that all well-typed programs satisfy robustness.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces robustness informally and shows how it adds value as a method for reasoning about information release in some simple program fragments. Section 3 presents basic assumptions and models used for this work, including a simple imperative language with an explicit declassification construct that downgrades confidentiality levels. Section 4 presents a generalized robustness condition in this language-based setting. Section 5 presents a security type system that enforces robustness in the imperative language. Section 6 presents more detailed examples and shows how the robust declassification condition gives insight into program security. Section 7 generalizes the robust declassification condition to allow untrusted code limited control over information release, and shows that useful code examples satisfy this limited robustness property. Section 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 concludes.
Robustness
The essential idea of robustness is that although systems may release some information, attackers should not be able to affect what information is released or whether information is released. Regardless of what attack is launched against the system, the same information should be released. This implies that a passive attacker who merely observes system execution learns no more than an active attacker who both changes and observes system execution. In a system that has robust declassification, the problem of understanding whether all information release is intentional in the presence of the attacker is reduced to the problem of understanding whether information flows are as intended when the attacker does nothing. It is not necessary to reason about all possible attacks.
Consider the following simple program, which releases information from a secret location z H to a publicly readable variable y L if the boolean variable x L is true, and otherwise has no effect:
The subscripts H and L are used to indicate secret ("high") and public ("low") information respectively. The special operator declassify is simply an identity function that explicitly releases information from high to low. Clearly this program is intended to release information and therefore violates noninterference. Although noninterference is violated, robustness allows us to gain more understanding of the security of this program. Suppose that the attacker is able to change the value of x L . In that case, the attacker is able to affect whether information is released; the declassification is not robust. Suppose instead that the attacker can affect the value of z H , perhaps by causing some other secret information to be copied into it. In that case the attacker can cause different information to be released than was intended. Conversely, if the attacker is unable to affect the values of these two variables, the declassification is robust because these are the only variables that affect what information is released from high to low.
It is clear from this example that the robustness of a system is contingent on the power an active attacker has to affect the execution of the system. A natural way to describe this power is by ascribing integrity labels to the information manipulated. High-integrity information and code are trusted and assumed not to be affected by the attacker; all low-integrity information and code are untrusted and assumed to be under the control of the attacker. Low-integrity variables may be changed by the attacker; low-integrity code may be replaced by the attacker with different code. This is a very general model of the system. The attacker may in fact be an ordinary user, in which case robustness means that program users cannot cause unintended information release, perhaps by providing unexpected inputs. Alternatively, as in the work on secure program partitioning [53, 54] , the system might be a distributed program in which some program code runs on untrusted hosts and is assumed to be controlled by a malicious attacker who will try to exploit declassification. (In fact, robustness was inspired by the work on secure program partitioning.)
A recent survey on declassification [43] categorizes approaches to information release by what information is declassified, by whom it is released, and where and when in the system declassification occurs. We view robustness as operating primarily on the who dimension. Robustness controls on whose behalf declassification occurs because it prevents untrusted attackers from affecting declassification. The security type system we suggest in Section 5 enforces these restrictions by controlling where information release can occur, which helps express which part of the system can release what information and on whose behalf. This aspect is provided by localizing information release to declassification statements, whose occurrence is regulated by the type system.
Other mechanisms that control information release, such as the decentralized label model [32] , also control who can declassify information, using an access control mechanism. Access control mechanisms can prevent the attacker from declassifying information directly, but robustness is a stronger notion of security because it prevents the attacker even from influencing declassification.
Requiring that the attacker cannot affect information release turns out to be too restrictive for many systems of interest; some systems satisfy their security requirements yet do not have robust declassification. Section 7 explores a relaxation of robust declassification that addresses this restrictiveness. An endorsement operation is added that explicitly says untrusted data may be treated as trusted, upgrading its integrity level. This leads to a relaxation of the robustness property that makes it less restrictive.
3 Language and attacker model
Security lattice
We assume that the security levels form a security lattice L. The ordering specifies the relationship between different security levels. To enable reasoning about both confidentiality and integrity, the security lattice L is a product of confidentiality and integrity lattices, L C and L I , with orderings C and I , respectively. Suppose x and y are both elements in the confidentiality lattice (or both in the integrity lattice). If x y then data at level x is no more confidential (no less trustworthy) than data at level y. An element of the product lattice is a pair (C( ), I( )) (which we sometimes write as C( )I( ) for brevity), denoting the confidentiality part of by C( ) and the integrity part by I( ). The ordering on L, L C , and L I corresponds to the restrictions on how data at a given security level can be used. The use of high-confidentiality data is more restricted than that of low-confidentiality data, which helps prevent information leaks. Dually, the use of low-integrity data is more restricted than that of high-integrity data, which helps prevent information corruption.
An example L LH of a security lattice is displayed in Figure 1 . This lattice is a product of a simple confidentiality lattice (with elements L and H of low and high confidentiality so that L C H) and a dual integrity lattice (with elements L and H of low and high integrity so that H I L). At the bottom of the lattice is the level LH for data that may be used arbitrarily. This data has the lowest confidentiality and highest integrity level. At the top of the lattice is the data that is most restrictive in usage. This data has the highest confidentiality and lowest integrity level.
Attacker model
In all these scenarios, the power of the attacker is described by a lattice element A, where the confidentiality level C(A) is the confidentiality of data the attacker is expected to be able to read, and the integrity level I(A) is the integrity of data or code that the attacker is expected to be able to affect. Thus, the robustness of a system is with respect to the attacker parameters (C(A), I(A)). As far as a given attacker is concerned, the four-point lattice L LH captures the relevant features of the general lattice L. Let us define high-and low-confidentiality areas of L by H C = { | C( ) C(A)} and L C = { | C( ) C(A)}, respectively. Similarly, we define low-and high-integrity areas by L I = { | I(A) I( )} and H I = { | I(A) I( )}, respectively. The four key areas of lattice L correspond exactly to the four points of lattice L LH :
This correspondence is illustrated in Figure 2 . From the attacker's point of view, area LH describes data that is visible but cannot be modified; area HH describes data that is not visible and cannot be modified; area LL describes data that is both visible and can be modified; and, finally, area HL describes data that is not visible but can be modified by the attacker. Because of this correspondence between L LH and L, results obtained for the lattice L LH generalize naturally to the full lattice L.
Language
This paper uses a simple sequential language consisting of expressions and commands. It is similar to several other security-typed imperative languages (e.g., [48, 2] ), and its semantics are largely standard (cf. [49] ).
Definition 1.
The language syntax is defined by the following grammar:
where val ranges over values Val = {false, true, 0, 1, . . . }, v ranges over variables Var , op ranges over arithmetic and boolean operations on expressions, and ranges over the security levels.
The security environment Γ : Var → L describes the type of each program variable as a security level. The security lattice and security environment together constitute a
Figure 3: Operational semantics.
security policy, specifying that information flow from a variable v 1 to a variable v 2 is allowed only if
. This means that the confidentiality (integrity) of v 2 must be at least (at most) as high as that of v 1 . In the rest of this paper, we assume that we are given a fixed, arbitrary security environment, Γ, which is an implicit parameter of the concepts defined below.
The only non-standard language expression is the construct declassify(e, ), which declassifies the security level of the expression e (which is simply the join of the security levels of the variables used in e) to the level ∈ L. Operationally, the result of declassify(e, ) is the same as that of e regardless of . The intention is that declassification is used for controlling the security level of information without affecting the execution of the program. Figure 3 , where we write M (e) to denote the result of evaluating expression e in memory M . We assume that operations used in expressions are totalexpressions always terminate (while command configurations might diverge).
In the operational semantics, α is an event that is either ·, indicating that no assignment has taken place during this transition step, or a variable v, indicating that the variable has been updated. We extend the label ordering to events by defining 
Formalizing robustness
Let us define the view of the memory at level . The idea is that the observer at level may only distinguish data whose security level is at or below . Formally, memories M 1 and M 2 are indistinguishable at a level (written
The restriction M | of memory M to the security level is defined by restricting the mapping to variables whose security level is at or below . In the following, we make use of this simple proposition:
Proof. By induction on the structure of c. The only interesting cases are for assignment and sequencing. For assignment, v := e, the result follows from the observation that Γ(v) and the definition of = , which implies that
The case for sequential composition follows immediately from the inductive hypothesis.
Because computation steps can be observed at level only if they update variables of level or below, and because we are not concerned with timing channels, we identify traces up to high-stuttering with respect to a security level .
Definition 2. The -projection of the trace t, written t| , where
is the sequence of ( -restrictions of) memories
Such that 0 < i 1 < i 2 < . . . and for every transition M j , c j αj −→ M j+1 , c j+1 in t, if α j then j + 1 = i k for some k, and for every i k in m, there is a j such that j + 1 = i k .
Let p 1 and p 2 be trace projections. Their concatenation p 1 · p 2 must take into account divergence and stuttering. If p 1 is infinite, then p 1 · p 2 = p 1 . Otherwise, we have
We need a simple proposition that relates sequential composition of commands with the projections of their traces: Proposition 2. If M, c 1 ⇓ M then for all and c 2 :
Proof. Straightforward from the definitions of the operational semantics and -projection of traces. Definition 3. Given traces t 1 and t 2 and a security level , we say that t 1 and t 2 are high-stutter equivalent up to , written
Intuitively, t 1 ∼ t 2 means that t 1 and t 2 look the same to an observer at level after all successive transitions involving memories related by = have been collapsed together, provided that the transition between them did not arise from an update. For example, consider
, ∀x ∈ Var . M 1 (x) = 0, and
) because the effect of the assignment l := h is distinguishable at the level :
, and the assignment to l updates the low parts of the memories with the same value: 
. We say that two configurations are strongly indistinguishable up to (written
Note that weak indistinguishability is timing-and termination-insensitive because it deems a diverging trace indistinguishable from any other trace; although strong indistinguishability is timing-insensitive, it requires the termination of both configurations so that the traces remain related throughout their entire execution. Because of the termination insensitivity, weak indistinguishability is not transitive, but transitivity is not needed in the subsequent development. (Note that the transitivity of strong indistinguishability follows from the transitivity of equality on values.)
For example, configurations M 1 , c and M 2 , c so that 
, which illustrates the intransitivity of weak indistinguishability, Noninterference says that if two memories are indistinguishable at a certain level, then the executions of a given program on these two memories are also (at least weakly) indistinguishable at that level:
We assume that the attacker has the ability to read and write some data manipulated by the program. Recall that robustness means an active attacker, who both observes and modifies part of the system state, should not learn more sensitive information than a passive attacker, who merely observes visible data. The power of the attacker to observe and modify system state can be described by a single point A in a security lattice. A passive A-attacker may read data at or below C(A) (i.e., at or below (C(A), I ) in the product lattice); an active A-attacker may also modify data at or above I(A) (i.e., at or above (⊥ C , I(A)) in the product lattice).
In general, an active attacker may change system behavior by injecting new code into the program. However, accesses by the attacker must satisfy certain conditions on what data can be read and modified. Code satisfying these conditions is considered a fair attack because the code should not be able to violate confidentiality and integrity directly; rather, a fair attack attempts exploiting insecure information flow in the trusted code.
Definition 7.
A command a is a fair attack (at some level ∈ LL) if it is formed according to the following grammar, where expressions e and b do not contain declassify:
For simplicity, each attack operates at a single security level . This does not restrict the attacker because the attacker is already assumed to completely control the LL region of the lattice (recall from Section 3 that the LL region is relative to the attacker's point A in the lattice), and is an adequate representative of this region. Anything that the attacker can read has lower confidentiality than , and anything the attacker can write to has lower integrity. So if attacker code used other levels in LL, the code could be translated to code that only used . In fact, our results are proved for a strictly more general class of attacks that we call A-attacks (defined in Section 5), which subsume fair attacks and may operate across different security levels.
Attacker-controlled low-integrity computation may be interspersed with trusted high-integrity code. To distinguish the two, the high-integrity code is represented as a program in which some statements are missing, replaced by holes (•). The idea is that the holes are places where the attacker can insert arbitrary low-integrity code. There may be multiple holes in the high-integrity code, represented by the notation •. The high-integrity computation is then a high-integrity context c [ •] in which the holes can be replaced by a vector of attacker code fragments a to obtain a complete program c[ a]. An attacker is thus a vector of such code fragments. A passive attacker is an attack vector that fills all holes with the low-integrity code from the original program. An active attacker is any attack vector that fills some hole in a way that changes the original program behavior.
Although the assumption that attackers are constrained to interpolating sequential code may seem artificial, it is a reasonable assumption to make both in a single-machine setting, where the attacker's code can be statically checked before it is run, and in a distributed setting where the attacker has complete power to change the untrusted code, but where that code is limited in its ability to affect the machines on which trusted code is run [53] .
High-integrity contexts are defined formally as follows: . This is formally expressed in the following definition (where we assume that F is the set of fair-attack vectors).
Definition 9 (Robustness). Command c[ •]
has robustness with respect to fair attacks at level A if
As noted, the attacker can observe data below the lattice point (C(A), I ). This level is used in the relations (C(A), I ) and ≈ (C(A), I ) , requiring equality for assignments to low-confidentiality variables. Observe that
Note that attacks in the vectors a and a may operate at different levels (as long as these levels are in the LL region).
The definition of robustness uses both strong and weak indistinguishability, which is needed to deal properly with nontermination. Because we are ignoring timing and termination channels, information is only really leaked if configurations are not weakly indistinguishable. However, the premise of the condition is based on strong indistinguishability because a sufficiently incompetent attacker may insert nonterminating code and thus make fewer observations than even a passive attacker. We are not concerned with such attackers.
Note that the robustness definition quantifies over both passive and active attacks. This is because neither passive or active attacker behavior is known a priori. The vector of skip commands is an example of a possible attack. Importantly, the robustness definition also guards against other attacks (which might affect what critical fragments of the target program are reachable). For example, under lattice L LH and attacker at LL, consider the following program (here and in the rest of the paper the subscript of a variable indicates its security level in Γ):
This program would be robust if a in Definition 9 were fixed to be the skip command (as c[a] would always diverge). However, the attacker may tamper with the declassification mechanism in the program because whether declassification code is reachable depends on the attacker-controlled variable x LL . This is indeed captured by Definition 9, which deems the program as non-robust (take a = x LL := −1 and a = x LL := 0). The robustness definition ensures that the attacker's actions cannot lead the declassification mechanism to increase the attacker's observations about secrets. Note that robustness is really a property of a high-integrity program context rather than of an en-
Because the low-integrity code a is assumed to be under the control of the attacker, the security property is insensitive to it.
For example, under lattice L LH and attacker at LL, consider programs:
No matter what (terminating attack) fills the hole, these programs are rejected by noninterference although their declassification operations are intended. On the other hand, these programs satisfy robustness because the attacker may not either influence what is declassified (by assigning to y HH in the former program) or manipulate the control flow leading to declassification (by assigning to x LH in the latter program). Indeed, no fair attack filling the hole may assign to either y HH or x LH . Note that the latter program is similar to the example from Section 2, except with integrity annotations. However, a similar program where x is low-integrity is properly rejected:
To see a successful attack, take a = x LL := 0 and a = x LL := 1 and memories different in z HH .
5 Security type system for robustness
Γ e : Γ e : Γ e op e :
Γ e : gives typing rules for the simple sequential language. These are security typing rules because they impose conditions on the security level components of types. As we show later in this section, any program that is well-typed according to these rules also satisfies the robustness property. Expressions and commands are typed with respect to a typing context that comprises both a security environment Γ and a programcounter security level pc. The program-counter security level tracks what information has affected control flow up to the current program point. For example, if pc is highconfidentiality at some program point, then an attacker might learn secrets from the fact that execution reached that point. If pc is low-integrity, the attacker might be able to affect whether control reaches that point.
We write Γ e : to mean that an expression e has type under an environment Γ and a security level pc. For commands, we write Γ, pc c if command c is well-typed under Γ and pc.
The typing rules control the information flow due to assignments and control flow in a largely standard fashion (cf. [48] ). However, the key rule governing uses of declassification is non-standard, though similar to that proposed by Zdancewic [50] (we discuss the relation at the end of this section). This rule states that only high-integrity data is allowed to be declassified and that declassification might only occur at a highintegrity program point (pc). The effect of this rule can be visualized by considering the lattice depicted in Figure 5 within the high-integrity area of the lattice, the attacker (who can only affect the lowintegrity area of the lattice) cannot influence uses of the declassification mechanism and therefore cannot exploit it.
Using the type system, we define A-attacks, programs controlled by the attacker at level A, which subsume fair attacks. We prove that well-typed programs are robust with respect to A-attacks (or simply "attacks" from here on) and therefore with respect to fair attacks. Under lattice L LH and A = LL, examples of attacks are programs skip (a harmless attack), x LL := y LL , and while x HL do skip. On the other hand, programs x HH := y LH and x LH := declassify(y LH , LH ) are not attacks because they manipulate high-integrity data. Note that programs like x LL := declassify(y HL , LL) and if x LL then y LL := declassify(z HH , LH ) else skip are not valid attacks because declassify may not be used in attacks. This is consistent with the discipline enforced by the type system that the attacker may not control declassification. All fair attacks are A-attacks, but the reverse is not true. For example, the program x HL := y HL is an A-attack but is not a fair attack because it reads from a confidential variable. Recall the partition of data according to the confidentiality (H C and L C ) and integrity (L I and H I ) levels from Section 3.2. The following propositions provide some useful (and straightforward to prove) properties of attacks. Proposition 3. A fair attack a at level ∈ LL is also an A-attack.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the attack a. The declassify expression cannot appear in a by construction, and to show that Γ, (⊥ C , I( )) a, we rely on an auxiliary proposition for expressions that shows that if ∀x ∈ Vars(e).Γ(x) = then Γ e : .
Proposition 4. An A-attack a (i) does not have occurrences of assignments to highintegrity variables (such v that Γ(v) ∈ H I ); and (ii) satisfies noninterference.
Proof. Part (i) follows by induction on the derivation that Γ, (⊥ C , I(A)) a. To see why, observe that the pc label in the typing judgments only increases as the derivation moves from the root toward the leaves (this is seen in the typing rule for conditional statements in which the branches are checked under the higher label pc). Therefore, when type checking any assignment statement v := e, it must be the case that (⊥ C , I(A)) pc and the typing rule for assignment implies that pc Γ(v). By transitivity, it follows that (⊥ C , I(A)) Γ(v), and we have I(A)
Part (ii) follows directly from Theorem 1 below.
The type system can be used to enforce two interesting properties: noninterference (if declassify is not used) and robust declassification (even if it is). Theorem 1. If Γ, pc c and declassify does not occur in c, then c satisfies noninterference.
Because the declassification-free part of the security type system is largely standard, this result is proved by induction on the evaluation of c, similar to the proof of Volpano et al. [48] . Note that although the noninterference condition by Volpano et al. is weaker (the attacker can only observe the low part of the final state), their noninterference proof is based on a stronger condition. In particular, this condition happens to guarantee for executions that start in memories that agree on low data, that assignments to low variables affect the memories in the same way (see the UPDATE case in the proof of Theorem 6.8 of [48] ). Hence, most of their proof can be simply reused for the present theorem. One simple proposition needed in the proof is the following: Proposition 5. If Γ e : where e contains no declassify expressions and M 1 = M 2 and then M 1 (e) = M 2 (e).
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. The only interesting case is when e is a variable, but that follows immediately from the definition of memory equivalence at and the assumption that .
The interesting question, however, is what the type system guarantees when declassification is used. Observing that declassification affects only confidentiality, we prove that the integrity part of the noninterference property is preserved in the presence of declassification:
Theorem 2. If Γ, pc c then for all integrity levels I we have
Proof. This theorem follows essentially in the same way as Theorem 1, the only differing case is when the program contains a declassify expression, so it suffices to show that noninterference holds for the program v := declassify(e, ).
Let M 1 = ( C ,I) M 2 be given. From the typing rule for declassify, we obtain that pc Γ(v) and Γ e : and I( ) = I( ) and , ∈ H I . Also from the typing rules, we know that e itself contains no declassifications. From the definition of memory equivalence, it suffices to show that if Γ(v) ( C , I) then M 1 (e) = M 2 (e).
Observe that Γ(v) and, since I( ) = I( ), we have ( C , I) and result follows by Proposition 5.
As for the confidentiality part, we show the key result of this paper: typable programs satisfy robustness and, thus, the attacker may not manipulate the declassification mechanism to leak more information than intended.
For robustness, it is important that holes not be placed at program points where the program counter pc is high-confidentiality, because then an attacker would be able to directly observe implicit flows [15] to the hole and could therefore cause information to leak even without a declassify. This restriction is achieved by defining a suitable typing rule for holes, permitting program contexts c[ •] to be type-checked:
The main theorem of the paper can now be stated:
Before proving the theorem, we present a few helpful propositions. One such proposition says that if a sequential composition of well-typed commands may not distinguish two low-equivalent memories (through terminating execution), then the first command of the composition may not distinguish between the memories (which implies that it terminates in some low-equivalent intermediate memories). Further, the second command may not distinguish between these intermediate memories. This property is achieved because of the trace-level granularity of the security condition: the indistinguishability of configurations requires the indistinguishability of traces (up to high-stuttering). Proof. Observe that the typing rules require that all variables v assigned to in the body of c satisfy pc Γ(v). Therefore Γ(v) and the result follows directly from the definition of -projection of traces.
Proof.
We proceed by induction on the structure of c 1 . We show the cases for skip, assignment, and sequential composition, and if. The loop case follows similarly to the case for conditionals.
• If c 1 = skip then from the definition of the operational semantics we have that:
• If c 1 = v := e, we let
(for i ∈ {1, 2}) and from the operational semantics we obtain that M 1 , v := e ⇓ M 1 and M 2 , v := e ⇓ M 2 . We choose N 1 = M 1 and N 2 = M 2 observe that
, we have M 1 , c 1 M 2 , c 1 because
Note that M i | = M i | , and it follows that Tr (
. This implies that the assignment step is -observable, so the projections must look like 
• If c 1 = if e then d 1 else d 2 then Γ e : and Γ, ( pc) d i (for i ∈ {1, 2}). If then by Proposition 5 we have that M 1 (e) = M 2 (e). Therefore both configurations take the same branch, and the result follows by application of the induction hypothesis. The case for follows from Proposition 6 and transitivity of .
The following proposition relates the executions of two well-typed programs formed by filling a target program with two different attacks. The proposition says that, assuming the set of high-integrity variables is not empty, if the memories in the initial configurations agree on high-integrity data and both configurations terminate then they also agree on high-integrity data at the end of computation. This is a form of noninterference of low-integrity code with high-integrity values.
then by Proposition 4 there are no assignments to highintegrity variables in either a or a , which gives the desired relation on the memories. Structural cases on c (where appropriate, we assume that a is split into two vectors a 1 and a 2 ): In order to prove Theorem 3, we show a stronger property of typable commands. Suppose we have a typable program context filled with an attack and two memories forming configurations with this command. The next proposition states that whenever the terminating behaviors of the configurations are indistinguishable for the attacker then no alteration of the attacker-controlled part of the initial memory or alteration of the attacker-controlled code may make the behaviors distinguishable for the attacker. The key idea is that because declassification is not allowed in a low-integrity context (pc), the type system ensures that changes in low-integrity values may not reflect on low-confidentiality behavior of the computation. 
Proof. If H I = ∅ then declassification is disallowed by the typing rules, and the proposition follows from Theorem 1. In the rest of the proof we assume H I = ∅, and proceed by induction on the structure of c [ •] . Suppose that for some c[ a] and memories
Structural cases on c[ a]
(where appropriate, we assume that a is split into two vectors a 1 and a 2 ):
This case is straightforward because by Proposition 4 attack a satisfies noninterference.
skip The proposition follows from the fact that M 1 = (C(A), I ) M 2 , which is obvious.
v := e The command has no holes, implying c[ a] = c[ a ]. If Γ(v) ∈ H C then the case is similar to skip because the assignment does not affect any part of the memory that is visible to the attacker. If Γ(v) ∈ L C then we have two sub-cases. If e is a declassification expression, then it does not depend on low-integrity variables, and hence low-confidentiality indistinguishability is preserved. If e is not a declassification expression, then the type system guarantees that Γ e : for such that , which implies that e may depend only on low-confidentiality data. Whether the data that is used in e comes from M 1 /M 2 or M 1 /M 2 does not matter because, in all cases, e evaluates to the same value in all of them. Hence, the assignment preserves low-confidentiality indistinguishability.
By Proposition 7 we infer 
, by the last part of Proposition 7 we have
. The induction hypothesis allows us to change memories N 1 and N 2 into N 1 and N 2 , respectively, and attack a 2 into a 2 , yielding
. Connecting the low-assignment traces for c 1 and c 2 , If ∀v ∈ Varsb. Γ(v) ∈ L C ∩ H I then b evaluates to the same value, say true, under all of M 1 , M 2 , M 1 , and M 2 , i.e., the execution of the conditional reduces to the same branch in both memories. We have
. By the induction hypothesis, we have 
If, on the other hand, the value of b is true then
. By the induction hypothesis, It is worth clarifying the relation of this type system to that defined by Zdancewic [50] . While both require high pc integrity in the typing rule for declassify, the present system also requires high integrity of the expression to be declassified. The purpose of the latter requirement is illustrated by the following example: This program is allowed by the typing rules presented by Zdancewic [50] . However, the program clearly violates the definition of robustness presented here. By requiring high integrity of the declassified expression, the type system in Figure 4 rejects the program.
Password checking example
This section applies robust declassification to a program that performs password checking, illustrating how the type system gives security types to password-checking routines and prevents attacks.
Password checking in general releases information about passwords when attempts are made to log on. This is true even when the login attempt is unsuccessful, because the user learns that the password is not the password tried. A password checker must therefore declassify the result of password checking in order to report it to the user. A danger is that an attacker might exploit this login procedure by encoding some other sensitive data as a password.
We consider UNIX-style password checking where the system database stores images (e.g., secure hashes) of password-salt pairs. The salt is a publicly readable string stored in the database for each user id, as an impediment to dictionary attacks. For a successful login, the user is required to provide a query such that the hash of the string and the salt for that user matches the image from the database.
Below are typed expressions/programs for computing the hash, matching the user input to the password image from the database, and updating the password. Arrows in the types for expressions indicate that under the types of the arguments on the left from the arrow, the type of the result is on the right from the arrow. The expression hash(pwd , salt) concatenates the password pwd with the salt salt and applies the one-way hash function buildHash to the concatenation (the latter is denoted by ||). The result is declassified to the level C salt (where Γ(salt) ∈ L C ). The command match(pwdI , salt, pwd , hashR, matchR) checks whether the password image pwdI matches the hash of the password pwd with the salt salt. It stores the result in the variable matchR. We assume that C v and I v denote the confidentiality C(Γ(v)) and integrity I(Γ(v)) of the variable v, respectively. Γ, pc hash(pwd , salt) :
where C matchR = C pwdI C salt , I matchR = I pwdI I, I = I pwd I salt ; and I(A) I, I(A) I(pc) (both I and I(pc) have high integrity). As before, basic security types are written in the form CI (e.g., LH) where C is the confidentiality level and I is the integrity level. Let us assume the lattice L LH from Figure 1 and A = LL. Instantiating the typings (and omitting the environment Γ) for these functions shows that they capture the desired intuition:
The users apply hash to a password and salt:
LH hash(pwd , salt) :
The users match a password to a password image: LH match(pwdI , salt, pwd , hashR, matchR) : LH ×LH ×HH ×LH ×LH
Consider an attack that exploits declassification in hash and match in order to leak information about whether x HH (Γ(x HH ) = HH ) equals y LL (Γ(y LL ) = LL): This attack is rejected by the type system because low-integrity data y LL is fed to match. Indeed, this attack compromises robustness. For example, take M 1 and M 2 such that M 1 (x HH ) = 2 and M 2 (x HH ) = 3; a = y LL := 0; and a = y LL := 2.
(which branch of the conditional is taken depends on the outcome of the match).
As a side note, this laundering attack is not defended against in many approaches that are agnostic about the origin (or integrity) of data. For example, a typical intransitive noninterference model accepts the attack as a secure program. Clearly, robust declassification and intransitive noninterference capture different aspects of safe downgrading.
The process of updating passwords can also be modeled as a typable program that satisfies robustness. We might define a procedure update to which the users must provide their old password in order to update to a new password:
Γ, pc update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP , hashR, matchR) = match(pwdI , salt, oldP , hashR, matchR);
where C salt (I salt I oldP I newP ) C pwdI I pwdI and I salt , I oldP , I newP , I(pc) have high integrity. In order for this code to be well-typed, both the old password oldP and the new password newP must be high-integrity variables; otherwise, hash would attempt to declassify low-integrity information newP (with the decision to declassify dependent on low-integrity information oldP ), which the type system prevents. Thus, an attacker is prevented from using the password system to launder information. Instantiating this typing to the simple lattice L LH and A = LL is as follows:
The users modify a password: LH update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP , hR, mR) : LH × LH × HH × HH × LH × LH
Endorsement and qualified robustness
Sometimes it makes sense to give untrusted code the ability to affect what information is released by a program. For example, consider an application that allows untrusted users to select and purchase information. The information provider does not care which information is selected, assuming that payment is forthcoming. This application is abstractly described by the following code:
There are two pieces of confidential information available, y HH and y HH . The purchaser computes the choice in low-integrity code •, which sets the variable x LL . The user expects to receive output on z LH . This code obviously violates robust declassification because the "attacks" x LL := 1 and x LL := 2 release different information, yet the program can reasonably be considered secure.
Characterizing qualified robustness
To address this shortcoming, we generalize robust declassification to a qualified robustness property in which untrusted code is given a limited ability to affect information release. This ability is marked explicitly in the code by the use of a new construct, endorse(e, ). This endorsement operation has the same result as the expression e but upgrades the integrity of the result, indicating that although this value might be affected by untrusted code, the real security policy is insensitive to the value. Suppose that the program contains endorsements of some expressions. We wish to qualify the robust declassification property to make it insensitive to how these expressions evaluate. To do this we consider the behavior of the program under an alternate semantics for endorse expressions, in which the endorse expression evaluates to a nondeterministically chosen new value val :
M, endorse(e, ) −→ val
Interpreting the endorse statement in this way makes the evaluation semantics nondeterministic, so it is necessary to modify the definitions of configuration indistinguishability to reflect the fact that a given configuration may have multiple traces.
Let T ⇓ stand for {t ∈ T | t ⇓}, the set of terminating traces from trace set T . Two trace sets T 1 and T 2 (generated by some two configurations) are indistinguishable up to (written
In other words, two trace sets are indistinguishable up to if either one of them contains diverging traces only or for any terminating trace from T 1 we can find a terminating trace from T 2 so that they are indistinguishable up to , and vice versa. We can now lift Definition 5 to multiple-trace semantics:
Definition 11. Two configurations M 1 , c 1 and M 2 , c 2 are weakly indistinguishable up to (written c 2 ) . We say that two configurations are strongly indistinguishable up to (written Using this notation, the robust declassification property can be qualified to express the idea that the attacker's effect on endorsed expressions does not matter:
Definition 12 (Qualified robustness). Command c[ •]
has qualified robustness with respect to fair attacks if
Note the similarity of qualified robustness to the original robustness property from Definition 9. In fact, the difference is entirely contained in the generalized indistinguishability relations (C(A), I ) and ≈ (C(A), I ) .
One may wonder why, if confidentiality and integrity are dual properties (cf. [5] ), the treatment of declassify and endorse are not more symmetric. We argue that there are at least two explanations:
• The first explanation is that robustness is fundamentally about regulating access to the potentially dangerous operations like declassify and endorse, and, because both of them are "privileged" operations, the robustness constraints should be the same, not dual, for them.
• Another explanation is that treating integrity as a strict dual to confidentiality leads to a very weak notion of integrity (see, for example, the discussion by Li et al. [24, 26] ), so we should not be surprised if treating them as duals leads to somewhat unsatisfactory results. The use of nondeterministic semantics for endorse but not declassify compensates for the differences between them.
It is fair to say that understanding the complete relation between declassification and endorsement is still unsettled, and poses an interesting problem for future work.
Enforcing qualified robustness
The use of endorse is governed by the following typing rule; in addition, attacker code may not use endorse:
Adding this rule to the type system has no impact on confidentiality when no declassify occurs in a program. To be more precise, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4. If Γ, pc c and no declassify occurs in c then for all confidentiality levels C we have
v := e If e = endorse(e , ) for some e and then v can result in any value. Clearly, M 1 , c ≈ (C, I ) M 2 , c regardless of the confidentiality level of v. If e is not an endorsement expression, then the proof is the same as in Theorem 1.
⇓ . There exist t 11 , t 12 , and N 1 such that t 1 = t 11 · t 12 and
⇓ so that t 11 ≈ (C, I ) t 21 . Suppose t 21 ⇓ N 2 for some N 2 . We know N 1 = (C, I ) N 2 by the induction hypothesis. This allows us to apply the induction hypothesis to c 2 . If Tr ( N 1 , c 2 ) ⇓ = ∅ or Tr ( N 2 , c 2 ) ⇓ = ∅ then we receive a contradiction to the initial assumption about c. Hence, we receive that there exists t 22 ∈ Tr ( N 2 , c 2 )
⇓ such that t 12 ≈ (C, I ) t 22 . Connecting the traces we receive t 1 ≈ (C, I ) t 21 · t 22 where t 21 · t 22 ∈ Tr ( M 2 , c 1 ; c 2 ) ⇓ , which finishes the proof.
The interesting question is what security assurance is guaranteed in the presence of both declassify and endorse. The rule above rejects possible misuses of the endorsement mechanism leading to undesired declassification, as illustrated by the following example:
In this example, the attacker has control over x LL which, in turn, controls whether the variable z LL is endorsed for assignment to y LH . It is through the compromise of y LH that the attacker might cause the declassification of w HH . This program does not satisfy qualified robustness (take
) and is rightfully rejected by the type system (endorse fails to type check under a lowintegrity pc). In general, we prove that all typable programs (using the extended type system that includes the rule for endorse) must satisfy qualified robustness:
As in Section 5, we prove the theorem with respect to a larger class of attacks, namely A-attacks. Recall that A-attacks subsume fair attacks by Proposition 3. In order to prove the theorem we lift the proof technique of Theorem 3 to a possibilistic setting by reasoning about the existence of individual traces that originate from a given configuration and possess desired properties. In parentheses, we provide references to the respective propositions and definitions for the non-qualified version of robustness.
Proposition 10 (4). An A-attack (i) does not have occurrences of assignments to highintegrity variables (such v that Γ(v) ∈ H I ); and (ii) satisfies (possibilistic) noninterference.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of c 1 , using mostly the same structure as Proposition 7. Note that since the operational semantics is deterministic except in the case of endorse, most of the cases for this proof follow directly from the prior proposition. Nondeterminism plays an interesting role only for the assignment and sequencing operations, so we show only those cases here. From the assumptions that the configurations are related, we obtain M 1 = M 2 .
• If c 1 = endorse(e), then we have
then the first part of the proposition follows because every trace in T 1 has -projection M 1 and every trace in T 2 has -projection M 2 . If Γ(x) then for every t 1 ∈ T 1 it is easy to find related trace in T 2 by choosing the same nondeterministic choice. The second part of the theorem follows by similar reasoning, by noting that if there were no possible way for c 1 to evaluate via related traces then it would be impossible to extend the traces in T 1 and T 2 with a trace for c 2 , which contradicts the assumption.
• 
But r 1 = t 1 · −→ u 1 for some t 1 and u 1 and we can construct r 2 by appending the corresponding t 2 and u 2 provided by the inductive hypothesis. The second part of the proof follows from the fact that we assume that c 1 ; c 2 is everywhere terminating and reasoning similar to the case above that says that it is not possible to extend two inequivalent traces to obtain equivalent ones. . If Γ(v) ∈ H I then the high-integrity parts of the memories M and M are not affected by the assignment, and the case is similar to skip. If Γ(v) ∈ H I and e is not an endorsement expression, then the type system guarantees that e might only depend on high-integrity data (if Γ e : then Γ(v)), which implies that N (w) = N (w) for all w such that Γ(w) ∈ H I . If Γ(v) ∈ H I and e is an endorsement expression, then any value can be assigned to v as an outcome of assignment under both M and M . In this case, t has the form
then by Proposition 4 there are no assignments to high-integrity variables in either a or a , which gives the desired relation on the traces. Structural cases on c (where appropriate, we assume that a is split into two vectors a 1 and a 2 ):
and t 2 ∈ Tr ( N , c 2 [ a 2 ] ). By the induction hypothesis there exists t 1 such that t 1 ∼ t 1 (for all such that Γ( ) ∈ H I ) and t 1 ⇓ N (for some N ). This implies N (v) = N (v) for all v that Γ(v) ∈ H I , and we can apply the induction hypothesis to c 2 . By the induction hypothesis, there exists t 2 with the initial memory N such that t 2 ∼ t 2 (for all such that Γ( ) ∈ H I ). Connecting the traces, we receive
As in Proposition 8.
As in Proposition 8. 
Proof. If H I = ∅ then declassification is disallowed by the typing rules, and the proposition follows from Theorem 4. In the rest of the proof we assume H I = ∅. A premise of the proposition is
) t 2 along with the symmetric condition where M 1 and M 2 are swapped (which is proved analogously). In the rest of the proof, we assume 
Connecting the traces for c 1 and c 2 , we
Theorem 5 is a simple corollary of the above proposition:
Proof (Theorem 5). By Proposition 13, setting
Below we consider two examples of typable and, thus, secure programs that involve both declassification and endorsement.
Password update example revisited
The first example is a variant of the password update code in which the requirement that the old and new passwords have high integrity is explicitly lifted (the assumption, in this case, is that checking the old password provides sufficient integrity assurance). Under the simple lattice L LH :
LH update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP , hashR, matchR) = oldH := endorse(oldP , LH ); newH := endorse(newP , LH ); match(pwdI , salt, oldH , hashR, matchR); if matchR then pwdI = hash(newH , salt) else skip which enables the following typing for password update:
The users modify a password: LH update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP , hR, mR) : LH × LH × HL × HL × LH × LH Under this typing, the above variant of update satisfies qualified robustness by Theorem 5.
Battleship game example
The second example is based on the game of Battleship, an example used by Zheng et al. [54] . Initially, two players place ships on their grid boards in secret. During the game they try to destroy each other's ships by firing shots at locations of the opponent's grid. On each move, the player making a shot learns whether it hit a ship or not. The game ends when all squares containing a player's ships are hit. It is critical to the security of a battleship implementation that information is disclosed one location at a time. Because the locations are initially secret, this disclosure must happen through declassification. However, a malicious opponent should not be able to hijack the control over the declassification mechanism to cause additional leaks about the secret state of the board. On the other hand, the opponent does have some control over what is disclosed because the opponent picks the grid location to hit. To allow the opponent to affect declassification in this way, endorse can be used to express the idea that any move by the opponent is acceptable.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the game from the viewpoint of one player only. The security classes can again be modeled by the simple lattice L LH with A = LL. Consider the following core fragment of the main battleship program loop: 
Observations on the semantic treatment of endorsement
The "scrambling" of the value of an endorsed expression allows for lifting the integrity of the expression. While such scrambling is based on a known approach to ignoring the difference between (high-confidentiality) values [21] , it is worth highlighting some effects of scrambling when using it for ignoring the difference between low-integrity values in the presence of endorsement. We illustrate these effects by two examples.
Consider Clearly, the scrambling treatment of endorsement may change the reachability of program commands. This example highlights that reachability can be affected in a way that makes intuitively insecure programs secure. Note that endorsement as scrambling merely reproduces arbitrary changes the attacker can make to the low-integrity memory before the endorse. If these changes are indeed arbitrary (which can be ensured by placing holes for low-integrity code immediately before occurrences of endorse) then reachability is not changed by the scrambling treatment of endorse, which allows for recovering from this undesirable effect. In any case, note that the above program is rightfully rejected by the type system because the second if command fails to typecheck.
Consider another example command:
This program is intuitively insecure because the attacker controls what is leaked by choosing c LL . However, the values of y HL and w HL are "forgotten" (and equalized) before they are written into x HH and v HH , respectively, because of the scrambling semantics of endorsement. Qualified robustness classifies the program as secure. Indeed, any outcome for z LH is possible independently of the initial memories and attacks inserted in the hole. Again, the above program is rightfully rejected by the type system because the if command fails to typecheck. The above examples illustrate that qualified robustness is in some cases more permissive than desired. An end-to-end strengthening of qualified robustness that is capable of rejecting these corner cases is an intriguing topic for future work.
Related work
Protecting confidential information in computer systems is an important problem that has been studied from many angles. This work has focused on language-based security, which has its roots in Cohen and Denning's work [11, 13, 15] . See the survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [39] for an overview of the language-based approach to information flow. With respect to declassification, the research most directly related to the topic of this paper is surveyed in Sabelfeld and Sands' work [43] , which has a detailed comparison of many downgrading models. Below, we discuss the connections most relevant to this work.
Related to this paper is Myers' and Liskov's decentralized label model [32] , which provides a rich policy language that includes a notion of ownership of the policy. Downgrading a principal's policy requires its authority. The decentralized label model has been implemented in the Jif compiler [33] . Work by Zdancewic and Myers [51, 50] introduced notions of robustness and an enforcement mechanism for robustness, as discussed in the introduction. The major contribution of this work is that it connects a (new) semantic security condition for robustness directly to a type-based enforcement mechanism; this connection has not been previously established.
The key observation behind the robustness approach is that to understand whether information release is secure, it is necessary to take into account the integrity of the decision to release information. Other work on controlled information release has not taken into account integrity, and as a result, does not address systems containing untrustworthy components.
Another approach to ensuring that only the intended information is released is to write a specification restricting which information should be released. Giambiagi's and Dam's work on admissible flows [12, 18] is an example of the specification approach. Their security condition requires that the implementation reveal no more information than the specification of a protocol. Relaxed noninterference [25] is a lighter-weight method for specifying what information should be released. It is a strict generalization of pure noninterference that gives an extensional definition of exactly what information may be declassified. Delimited information release [40] allows these specifications to be given explicitly, via "escape hatches". These escape hatches are represented by expressions that might legitimately leak sensitive information. Delimited release guarantees that the program may leak no more information than the escape hatch expressions alone.
The specification approach has value because it says directly what may be released. However, in the presence of an attacker, even the specification may contain subtle vulnerabilities that require careful analysis; we expect robustness to be a useful tool for analyzing such specifications because it captures an important property that specifications should ordinarily satisfy.
Despite their importance, general downgrading mechanisms and their related security policies are not yet thoroughly understood. Partial information flow policies [11, 21, 42] weaken noninterference by partitioning the domain of confidential information into subdomains such that noninterference is required only within each subdomain. Quantitative information flow policies [14, 27, 9] restrict the information-theoretic quantity of downgraded information. Policies for complexity-theoretic information flow [22, 23] aim to prevent complexity-bound attackers from laundering information through programs that declassify the result of encryption. Approximate noninterference [16] relaxes noninterference by allowing confidential processes to be (in a probabilistic sense) approximately similar for the attacker.
Intransitive noninterference policies [38, 34, 37, 28] alter noninterference so that the interference relation is intransitive. Certain information flows are designated as downward and must pass through trusted system components. The language-based work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [4] similarly allows policies for information released to a set of agents. Bossi et al. [6] offer a framework where downgrading is characterized by a generalization of unwinding relations. Mantel and Sands [29] consider the problem of specifying and enforcing intransitive noninterference in a multi-threaded language-based setting. Such policies are attractive, but the concept of robustness in this paper is largely orthogonal to intransitive noninterference (cf. the discussion on the laundering attack in Section 6), suggesting that it may be profitable to combine the two approaches.
Volpano and Smith [47] consider a restricted form of declassification, in the form of a built in match h (l) operation, intended to model the password example. They require h to be an unmodifiable constant when introducing match h (l), but this means that password may not be updated. Volpano's subsequent work [45] models one-way functions by primitives f (h) and a match-like f (h) = f (r) (where h and r correspond to the password and user query, respectively), which are used in a hash-based password checking. However, the assumption is that one-way functions may not be applied to modifiable secrets. Both studies argue that one could do updates in an independent program that satisfies noninterference. However, in general this opens up possibilities for laundering attacks. The match, f (h), and f (h) = f (r) primitives are less general than declassification.
The alternate semantics for endorse that are used to define the qualified robustness are inspired by the "havoc" semantics that Joshi and Leino used to model confidentiality [21] .
Conclusions
This paper presents a language-based robustness property that characterizes an important aspect of security policies for information release: that information release mechanisms cannot be exploited to release more information than intended. The languagebased security condition generalizes the earlier robustness condition of Zdancewic and Myers [51] by expressing the property in a language-based setting: specifically, for a simple imperative programming language. Second, untrusted code and data are explicitly part of the system rather than an aspect that appears only when there is an active attacker. This removes an artificial modeling limitation of the earlier robustness condition. Third, a generalized security condition called qualified robustness is introduced that grants untrusted code a limited ability to affect information release.
The key contribution of the paper is a demonstration that robustness can be enforced by a compile-time program analysis based on a simple type system. A type system is given that tracks data confidentiality and integrity in the imperative programming language, similarly to the type system defined in [50] ; this paper takes the new step of proving that all well-typed programs satisfy a language-based robustness condition. In addition, the analysis is generalized to accommodate untrusted code that is explicitly permitted to have a limited effect over information release.
Robust declassification appears to be a useful property for describing a variety of systems. The work was especially motivated by the work on Jif/split, a system that transforms programs to run securely on a distributed system [53, 54] . Jif/split automatically splits a sequential program into fragments that it assigns to hosts with sufficient trust levels. This system maps naturally onto the formal framework described here; holes correspond to low-integrity computation that can be run on untrusted host machines. In general, being an A-attack (cf. Definition 10) is required for a program to be placed on an A-trusted host. Thus, the results of this paper are a promising step toward the goal of establishing the robustness of the Jif/split transformation for the full Jif/split language.
Much further work is possible in this area. The security model in this paper assumes, as is common, a termination-insensitive and timing-insensitive attacker. However, we anticipate no major difficulties in adapting the robustness model and the security type system to enforce robust declassification for termination-sensitive or timingsensitive attacks. These are worthwhile directions for future investigations.
Although we have argued that the sequential programming model is reasonable, and certainly a reasonable starting point, considering the impact of concurrency and concurrent attackers would be an important generalization. Combining robust declassification with other security properties related to downgrading (such as intransitive noninterference or relaxed noninterference) would also be of interest.
